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ABSTRACT
The role of property rights in resource allocation has been one of
the central themes in development economics. There exists exten-
sive theoretical arguments that property rights in land are closely
associated with the productive efficiency of agricultural resources as
well as investment decisions. However, empirical findings have not
been conclusive. This has been complicated due to possible endoge-
neity of titles, unobserved hetrogeneities and the non-experimental
nature of the data. To overcome these problems, the study employs
an instrumental variable and fixed effects models. The inheritance
status of a plot is used as an IV for the titling status of a plot. Using
the 2010/2011 Tanzania National Survey data, it is shown that the
effects of titling on investment is positive and sizable. Formal tests
of endogeneity are presented to establish the claim that titles are
endogenous.
1. Introduction
The role of property rights in resource allocation has been one of the
central themes in development economics. There have existed extensive
theoretical arguments that property rights in land are closely associated
with the allocative efficiency of agricultural resources and investment de-
cisions. Various arguments have been forwarded to support the strong
linkages between well-defined formal land rights and investment decisi-
ons. Goldstein and Udry (2008) argue; it is apparent that investment
incentives depend on expectations of rights over the returns to that in-
vestment and hence on the nature of property rights. Individuals do not
invest if the fruits of their investments are seized by others (Besley, 1995).
Fear of expropriation could discourage long term investments on land.
Land titles induce investment through improved access to credit through
collateralization of land (Feder et al. 1988). Improved rights through
titling simplify land exchanges and transactions, hence enabling the ef-
ficiency gains from trade and hence investment (Besley, 1995). Gershon
and David (1991) also discuss the particular aspect of efficiency loss due
to asymmetric information associated with insecure land tenure. In his
most influential work “The Mystery of Capital“, De Soto (2000) explains
1
2why capitalism triumphs in the west and fails everywhere else. In these
countries, he argues,
... Because the rights to these possessions are not ade-
quately documented, these assets cannot readily be tur-
ned into capital, cannot be traded outside of narrow local
circles where people know and trust each other, cannot be
used as collateral for a loan, and cannot be used as a share
against an investment. In the west, by contrast, every par-
cel of land, ... is represented in a property document that
is the visible sign of a vast hidden process that connects
all these assets to the rest of the economy.
Following these arguments, land titling or registration emerged as a very
popular policy prescription to enhance productivity and reduce poverty.
With ownership officially documented and verified, the risk of challenges
to ownership will be reduced, and the likelihood of having to incur high
costs in defending one’s possession of land will be lower, incentives to
invest will be enhanced, and land productivity will be increased (Feder
and Nishio, 1999). Despite all the theoretical arguments for land titling,
empirical evidence has not been clear and definite. There has not been
clarity and conformity of results on the precise outcomes of land titling.
The explanations are both methodological and conceptual. The identifi-
cation of land titling effects is a difficult task because it typically faces
the problem that formal property rights are endogenous (Galiani and
Schargrodsky, 2010). The allocation of property rights across households
is usually not random but based on a set of distinguishing features inclu-
ding the existing investment level on land. Besides, there are conceptual
issues that put into question the property rights paradigm. For example,
the gains from trade could be realized only in an efficient and free market,
an unusual characteristics of most land markets in developing countries.
In addition, private property titling could fuel rent seeking (Loehr, 2010).
Land registration can create rather than reduce uncertainty and conflict
over land rights (Atwood, 1990). It might increase risks and transacti-
on costs for certain numerically important groups, especially local people
who rely on existing informal means to establish and safeguard their land
claims (ibid).
The purpose in this study is to test the property right paradigm and ad-
opt an empirical investigation of the validity of the claims made by the
property rights advocates in developing economies. The particular inte-
rest is to analyze if land titling leads to the presumed outcomes based
on the property rights paradigm. Various studies have documented the
relationship between tenure security and investment in developing econo-
mies. There is a predominant consensus in empirical literature that well
3defined property right structures enhance investment and hence increa-
sed agricultural production (Feder et al, 1988, Blarel, 1994; Gallinai and
Schargodsky, 2010). Yet, whether formal land titling yields the expected
results has been controversial in empirical studies. A group of studies
discovered a positive association between titling of plots and agricultu-
ral investments (Alston et al, 1996). Others (e.g. Bellemare, 2012) found
out that titles have no impact on investment and productivity. Another
study (Place and Otuska, 2002) in Uganda, found that the direction of
causality between formal title and fixed investment varies with the type
of investment.
Empirical studies have been riddled with difficulties. Data on fixed in-
vestment were often binary, reducing the likelihood of relating titling
to continuous investment data (Smith, 2006). Binary choice models are
regression models with less information compared to their counterpart.
Most importantly, the identification of land titling effects is a difficult
task because it typically faces the problem that formal property rights
are endogenous (Besley, 1995; Galiani and Schargrodsky, 2010). The al-
location of property rights across households is not random but based on
as set of distinguishing household and village level characteristics inclu-
ding the existing investment level on land, presence of legal instruments
as well as other household unobservables. This study attempts to address
these empirical issues by the use of instrumental variables method and
village level fixed effects.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section presents
the basic conceptual framework used in the study along with a brief re-
view of related literature. Section three details the empirical framework
applied in the study followed by a description of the data and variables.
Section five presents the results. Section six concludes with possible po-
licy implications and future research directions.
2. Conceptual Framework
In his book, “the Mysteries of Capital“, De Soto (2010) argued the failure
of developing economies to establish well defined system of land rights is
responsible for their weak economic performance. Though interest on the
significance of well defined land rights grew after De Soto‘s book, there
has already been a significant discourse since the 1990‘s. Three arguments
are presented to explain the positive implications of secure land tenure
on investment. First, well defined rights endow the farmer with the free-
dom from possible expropriation (Demsetz, 1967; Alchian and Demsetz,
1973). Second, property rights on land provide for acceptable collateral
asset, hence enhancing access to credit and easing the liquidity constraint
4for investment (Feder et al. 1988). Finally, official land titles, by making
transfer of land through sale easy, lead to a more efficient resource allo-
cation by enabling the realization of the gains from trade (Besley, 1995).
But the empirical evidence has not been compellingly supportive of these
premises.
Besley (1995) provided the fundamental conceptual framework for ana-
lyzing the link between property rights and long term investment on
land based on the three channels. This study follows Besley’s (1995) fra-
mework. Consider an individual making an investment decision on how
much capital (kt) to invest at time t on a given plot. The return from
investment function for time t + 1: Vt+1 depends on property rights, de-
noted by Rt+1:
1
(1) Vt+1 = V (kt(Rt+1), Rt+1)
Since tenure security could be driving investment on the land, land right
is considered endogenous2 and is given by the general equation where
Rt+1 is increasing in both kt and Rt.
(2) Rt+1 = ψ(λkt, (Rt)
The return on investment is assumed to be increasing in both kt and
Rt+1 and concave in kt. The cost of investment, that is increasing in kt
and non-increasing in Rt+1 is given by:
(3) C(kt(Rt+1), Rt+1)
The optimal investment choice satisfies the return (profit) maximizing
condition of the farmer:
(4) max W (kt, ψ(λkt, Rt)) ≡ V (kt, ψ(λkt, Rt))− C(kt, ψ(λkt, Rt))
From the optimization problem, it follows that investment increases as
rights are improved. Solving the optimization yields an investment func-
tion that provides the framework for the empirical model in this study:
(5) kt = υ(Rt)
1Besley‘s (1995) original specification denotes investment as Vt+1 = V (kt, Rt+1). Ho-
wever; investment is determined by the property right regime. Hence, the original
investment function is slightly modified to Vt+1 = V (kt(Rt+1), Rt+1) and hence the
cost function.
2This is the popular endogeneity problem associated with land titling. However, en-
dogeneity could as well be either due to selection or other omitted variables. It is
challenging to confirm that the endogeneity is due to reverse causality as suggested
by Besley (1995).
5The claim that individual land titles through formalizing land rights dri-
ves investment has been found to be fragile. First, the expected efficiency
gains from trade could be realized only in an efficient and free market,
an unusual characteristics of most land markets in developing countries.
Property titling could also fuel rent seeking (Loehr, 2010; Platteau, 1996).
The success of property titling programs could be compromised by cap-
ture of these programs by local elites who are better informed about the
processes and procedures. Still, this might not imply a reduction in in-
vestment on land, rather a possible rise due to an increase in investment
capacity from the elites. Land registration can also create rather than re-
duce uncertainty and conflict over land rights (Atwood, 1990). It might
increase risks and transaction costs for certain numerically important
groups, especially local people who rely on existing informal means to
establish and safeguard their land claims (ibid). Assuming that each of
the three channels through which higher tenure security enhance invest-
ment is an oversimplification. Testing the efficacy of each of the three
channels separately is a topic for future research. All said, the controver-
sies on whether improved land rights and security through formalization
of rights yields the expected rise in investment can only be substantiated
using empirical analysis. This study attempts to address this empirical
issue by the use of instrumental variables method and village level fixed
effects. The principal argument that rights are endogenous since farmers
tend to invest on land to protect their rights or claims on the land (Bes-
ley, 1995) has not been formally tested. It’s largely based on ancillary
evidence. With the use of simple comparison of the results from the fi-
xed effects and IV models as well as statistical tests of identification, the
study tests this widely held belief.
3. Empirical Framework
The basic empirical strategy, following Besley (1995), was described with
the following fundamental regression equation.
(6) yijk = f(Rij, Pij, Xij, εij)
Where yijk is the investment level k undertaken by household i on plot
j ; Rij is the property right status of the plot,Pij is a set of plot specific
characteristics, Xij is a set of household characteristics and εij is the
stochastic element.
In the ideal setting of an experimental design, the treatment group com-
prises of plots of land that are randomly titled. Hence, simple testing
6of the difference in investment behavior between titled and non-titled
plots would yield the required results. This would however require repea-
ted observations of randomly assigned titles and their counterpart plots
across several villages and over a relatively longer time period. The data
set used in this study is only cross-sectional.3 And, it is hardly possible
that land titles are randomly assigned. It is possible that the plots in a
given village are more likely to be titled than in other villages (ibid.). Or,
more importantly, households who seek titles could be systematically dif-
ferent from those who don‘t. To account for these systematic differences,
various controls are used both at the household and plot level including
soil quality, steepness of plot, wealth status of household, distance to
market from the plot, and others. Controlling for these characteristics is
critical in understanding their investment behavior. Hence the following
basic model will be estimated.
(7) yijk = αkXi + βkRij + γkPij + εij
However, the inclusion of the controls provides only a limited solution
leaving a concern that measured rights might also proxy for omitted va-
riables such as the village political structure, farmers’ investment ability
or knowledge. The distribution of land titles runs across administrative
procedures. The implementation of the titling program differs across va-
rious regions in a country. Land titles are applied in different periods of
time in various regions. The extent of tenure security availed by the tiles
also differs based on local administrative factors such as the extent of elite
capture, recent history of tenure security and the level of trust/security
a title provides. This would bias the estimates of (5) and one could only
find a spurious link between land rights and investment. Without con-
trolling for these village specific fixed effect, one would expect to see
differential effects of land titles on investment. The village fixed effect
may also represent other time invariant variables. In Tanzania, the sur-
vey identifies 26 administrative regions (villages). The following model is
estimated with village level fixed effects (αki):.
(8) yijk = αki + βkRij + γkPij + εij
Though this method yields a better relationship between titling and in-
vestment, there are still concerns with establishing actual causality bet-
ween land titling and investment. Because, the identification of land tit-
ling effects in this framework is difficult due to the fact that land titles
3Use of panel data won‘t also help the results since land titles are usually fixed and
less likely to change within short to medium period of time.
7might be endogenous. In fact, a reverse causation has commonly been
suggested in which investments on a plot of land can possibly secure the
owner’s right to the land (Besley, 1995). For example, households could
invest in infrastructure as well as tree boundaries to secure their tenure.
To account for the endogeneity of land rights or titling, the following
empirical model is estimated with instrumental variables method.
(9) yijk = αi + βRij + γkPij + ψXi + εij
Rij = σij + ϕZij + ηij
Where, Zij is the instrumental variable for the ownership of a formal tit-
le of ownership for plot j by household i. Given the above specification,
there is a need to employ an efficient instrument for property rights that
is exogenous and relevant. The literature in the choice of instruments
ranges from those that use no instruments at all (e.g. Smith, 2004) to
those who suggested multiple instruments (Besley, 1995). Besley (1995)
suggested four possible instruments of property rights: (i.) Whether there
is a transfer deed, (ii.) Whether the household has ever litigated over its
right to the field, (iii.) How the field was acquired, (iv.) How many years
the field has been owned. Yet, the first instrument is endogenous itself
since investment could be made to secure the transfer deed as it would to
secure official land title. The fourth IV also fails to satisfy the externa-
lity/exogeneity assumption, since the number of years the plot has been
owned determines the already existing level of investment on the land.
Most other empirical work in the field employed community level indi-
cators such as the legislative framework or some district level indicator.
For example, Do and Iyer (2010) used the province-level proportion of
households with land user titles as a measure of the probability that a
given household would have a land use certificates. The challenge with
these instruments, however is that they have different unit of analysis
(province) than that of the original variable, title ownership, which is
a plot level characteristic. Mullan et. al (2010) uses village fixed effects
to capture the impact of village land rights manipulation on migration.
This makes the instrument weak in terms of explaining within communi-
ty variation in having title and the related investment implications. This
is particularly problematic since the interest is in explaining differences
in investment in plots with differing title after controlling for other va-
riables for households and plots which would be preferably located close
to each other than across villages.
This study exploits the fact that a predominant number of households
(47%) own more than a single plot with different title structures. This al-
lows for a close to experimental analysis of the distinction between titled
8and non-titled plots within a single household. Hence, using a village or
community level instrument would limit our understanding of the within
village variations as well as the within household variations across plots.
In cases when the difference is across villages and is difficult to control for
unobservables, using household level fixed effects would be appropriate.
The inheritance status of the plot is used to instrument for the titling
status of the plot. The inheritance status variable provides an exogenous
source of variation that determines the probability of seeking to have a
land titled or not. The underlying assumption is that it is external to the
investment decision on that specific plot. But how the plot is acquired
would affect the likelihood of seeking to have a title. A simple regression
of land title status on inheritance status indicates strong possible associa-
tion between the two variables, hence satisfying the ’relevance’ (Greene,
2012) assumption. 2SLS method will be employed to estimate the instru-
mental variable model (7). Since theoretical and Monte Carlo simulations
indicate that the limited information maximum likelihood (LIML) esti-
mator may yield less bias and confidence intervals with better coverage
rates than the 2SLS estimator (Poi, 2006; Stock,et al, 2002), LIML re-
sults are presented and compared with 2SLS. Various permutations of
control variables will be used to check robustness and sensitivity of the
results. Finally, formal tests will be undertaken to establish the widely
held claim that land titles are endogenous. Various tests of identification
will be undertaken to check for the strength of the selected IV.
4. Data and Variables
The study uses the 2010/2011 Tanzania Living Standards Measurement
Survey; a nationally representative household survey that collected in-
formation on a wide range of topics including agricultural production,
non-farm income generating activities, and a wealth of other household
characteristics. Information is collected at a plot level. Farmers were as-
ked about the size and number of plots and titles they possessed and
the usage of plots. Information on the main crop cultivated, decisions on
which crop to cultivate, soil type and quality as well as the steepness
of plot were also collected. Besides, there is information on the number
of permanent crops and trees planted on each plot. Unlike many other
surveys, there is information on the titling status of each plot. A list of
the variables used in the study is presented in Table 1 below.
The dependent variable used to proxy for fixed investment is the num-
ber of trees or permanent crops per acre on each plot. Considering the
per acre investment rather than the total investment helps account for
variations due to size of plot. These include the planting of trees, eit-
her fruit or otherwise, and permanent crops that take relatively many
9years to yield output. Tree planting has been the preferred proxy for fi-
xed investment (Besley, 1995; Smith, 2004; Bandiera, 2007; Bellemare,
2010). However, unlike all these studies which employed a binary varia-
ble to determine whether investment has been undertaken, a continuous
measure of number of trees planted will be used. Since planting of trees
and permanent crops might not be the appropriate investment choice for
households in urban areas, the study will only focus on rural households.
The analysis identifies the effect of land titles on investment using plot
level and household level characteristics. Household level characteristics
include the demographic structure of the household, education of adults
in the household, the main occupation of the head, as well as the wealth
index as a proxy for the economic status of the household. Plot level
characteristics used in the study are primarily the specific feature of the
plot in terms of soil quality, steepness of plot, and proximity to markets.
Table 2 presents a descriptive statistics of the variables used in the study.
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Tabelle 1. Description of Variables
Variables
Dependent Variable
No. of permanent crops and trees per hectare on a plot
Independent Variables
Household Level Characteristics
Age of household head
Average education of adults
Male labor
Female labor
No. of children
Distance to the nearest market (KM.)
Non agricultural wealth index
Plot Level Characteristics
No. of plots
Area of plot (ha.)
Slope of Plot
Flat top
Slightly sloped
Very steep
Years of holding
Soil quality
Good
Average
Bad
District and Regional Variables
District (1 to 8)
Region (1 to 26)
Instrumental variable for land title on a plot
Inheritance status (=1 if plot is inherited, =0 otherwise)
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5. Results
Results corresponding to the main hypotheses suggest that, the titling
status of a plot matters significantly in long term investment decisions.
Providing land certification is found to have a strong positive economic
impact in terms of increasing long term investment as shown in the re-
sults from variants of the models. Table 3 reports results of basic OLS
estimates of model (7) and village specific fixed effects model (8). Results
from the fixed effects models show that the title status of the plot did ha-
ve significant positive effect on the number of trees and permanent crops
planted on a plot. Plots with titles accrue higher investment per acre
than plots without titles. After controlling for titles, households with fe-
male heads tend to undertake higher long term investment on their plots
compared to their counterparts. Slopes of the plots and number of plots
a household owns are other factors that explain differences in investment
among plots and households. It might seem counter-intuitive that fewer
number of trees are planted on flatter plots. However, it is more reaso-
nable to presume that more suitable and flatter plots are used for the
production of recurrent and staple crops. The effect of titling on the num-
ber of trees and permanent crops planted declines by about 50% when
controlling for regional fixed factors. Hence, including household fixed
effects suggests a strong but lower positive relationship between titling
status and investment when controlling for unobserved village level cha-
racteristics. As indicated previously, this relationship between titling and
investment might have been biased due to the endogeneity of titling. To
address this, IV models are estimated and variants of the estimation re-
sults are presented in Table 4.
Variations of the instrumental variable model estimates also show that
certification of land through titles matters significantly in investment de-
cisions. Both 2SLS and LIML yield similar results. The last column in
Table 4 reports estimates for LIML while the others were results based
on 2SLS.Both the fixed effects and the IV models show that titling has
a sizable effect on the number of permanent crops or trees planted. Both
the fixed effects model and the IV model yield consistent and robust re-
sults with respect to the positive and sizable effect of secure land tenure
in the form of formal title on investment. These findings are robust to
various specifications.Inclusion and exclusion of various household and
plot level characteristics did not change the results. However, the titling
coefficients in the IV model are almost five times greater than that of the
fixed effect. The impact of improved rights through land titles increases
significantly with the use of instrumental variables compared to the fixed
effects model. This might indicate that the fixed effects model estima-
tes are biased due to endogeneity of titles. Tests of the weakness of the
13
instruments suggest the strength of the chosen instrument, hence a reaso-
nable validation of the choice of the inheritance status as an appropriate
IV. Various tests of endogeneity including the Durbin and Wu-Hausman
statistics confirm the endogeneity of titles.
The findings reaffirm the property rights paradigm that improved tenure
security through formal titles enhances fixed investments. This may also
indicate the empirical challenge of understanding the relationship bet-
ween property rights and investment is attributed largely to endogeneity
of land titles. But, it fails to confirm the popular claim that land rights
are endogenous because farmers undertake investment decisions in the
effort to ensure greater tenure security. Though titles are endogenous, it
is not clear if this is due to reverse causality, unobserved hetrogeneities,
selection or omission of variables. Though the study confirms the expec-
tation that land titles encourage long term investment on the land, it
doesn’t provide further information about the channels through which
titles provide incentives for increased invesment. Further understanding
the channels through which formal titles impact investment requires fur-
ther investigation. Revealing if this relationship is working through en-
hanced assurance of future benefits, increased access to credit or greater
efficiency gains from ease of exchange requires further investigation.
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Tabelle 3. OLS and Fixed Effects Model Results
Dependent Variable: Number of trees and permanent crops per acre on a plot
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Land Title 126.5*** 154.3*** 62.17** 89.60*** 103.2***
(27.41) (34.64) (27.00) (29.37) (33.70)
Female head 93.80*** 46.80* 77.42**
(32.49) (27.30) (31.48)
Age of household head 0.531 -0.0738 2.177
(5.418) (4.522) (5.244)
Age of household head squared -0.00424 -0.00126 -0.0214
(0.0518) (0.0431) (0.0501)
Average education of adults 6.162 2.894 0.0179
(4.890) (4.006) (4.892)
Main occupation of head is agri. -0.308 -1.268
(42.54) (42.77)
Male labor -3.788 3.984 4.674
(11.62) (9.878) (11.61)
Female labor -1.937 -4.651 -3.940
(13.96) (11.80) (13.55)
No. of children -7.872 -9.355* -9.534
(6.004) (5.185) (5.906)
No. of plots -27.46*** -17.55** -14.26*
(7.578) (6.984) (8.016)
Flat bottom -134.0*** -74.90* -85.13*
(45.35) (42.01) (46.19)
Flat top -148.9** -112.9** -128.1**
(62.13) (52.95) (59.97)
Slightly sloped -111.4** -79.77* -98.39**
(46.30) (41.25) (45.10)
Good soil quality 11.12 51.05 52.40
(42.50) (36.21) (41.82)
Average soil quality 10.44 49.44 45.58
(42.96) (36.14) (41.77)
Distance to the nearest market -2.515 -4.585
(4.862) (4.732)
RURAL: non-agricultural wealth index 10.37 -4.470
(14.03) (13.82)
District = 2 -10.02
(34.13)
District = 3 -74.76*
(38.29)
District = 4 -22.99
(41.15)
District = 5 -63.89
(43.29)
District = 6 -82.48*
(48.18)
District = 7 -110.0
(98.69)
District = 8 -93.44
(133.9)
Constant 58.87*** 254.0* 67.55*** 161.6 122.3
(10.07) (151.7) (9.555) (119.9) (145.4)
Fixed effects None None Region Region Region
(Districts dummy) (Village) (Village) (Village)
Observations 1,683 1,126 1,683 1,390 1,126
R-squared 0.013 0.060 0.134 0.154 0.155
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Tabelle 4. IV Model Results
DV: No. of trees/permanent crops per acre
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4)
Land Title 481.1*** 424.3*** 489.9*** 489.9***
(73.41) (65.68) (73.29) (73.29)
Female head 99.00*** 77.95*** 99.82*** 99.82***
(33.45) (28.92) (33.49) (33.49)
Age of household head 1.084 -2.099 1.253 1.253
(5.567) (4.806) (5.583) (5.583)
Age of household head squared -0.0110 0.0161 -0.0132 -0.0132
(0.0532) (0.0459) (0.0534) (0.0534)
Average education of adults 5.092 6.255 4.925 4.925
(5.036) (4.025) (5.043) (5.043)
hh b11==AGRICULTURE/ LIVESTOCK 50.93 48.47 48.47
(44.81) (44.80) (44.80)
Male labor -6.527 -4.336 -7.657 -7.657
(11.99) (10.29) (11.99) (11.99)
Female labor 0.350 0.541 -0.711 -0.711
(14.38) (12.57) (14.39) (14.39)
No. of children -10.75* -9.235* -10.91* -10.91*
(6.210) (5.467) (6.212) (6.212)
RURAL: non-agricultural wealth index 0.664 2.829 2.829
(14.50) (14.52) (14.52)
No. of plots -19.81** -22.57*** -20.87*** -20.87***
(7.900) (6.919) (7.907) (7.907)
Flat bottom -44.38* -132.0*** -142.2*** -142.2***
(25.30) (42.53) (46.74) (46.74)
Flat top -97.22* -173.7*** -197.4*** -197.4***
(50.70) (56.63) (64.66) (64.66)
Distance to the nearest market -4.993 -4.344 -4.344
(5.012) (5.020) (5.020)
District = 2 20.30 14.10 17.65 17.65
(35.48) (30.90) (35.55) (35.55)
District = 3 -81.34** -34.04 -81.42** -81.42**
(39.49) (34.49) (39.47) (39.47)
District = 4 2.607 6.766 2.029 2.029
(42.68) (36.56) (42.66) (42.66)
District = 5 -32.24 -25.56 -31.77 -31.77
(44.94) (38.71) (45.01) (45.01)
District = 6 -72.73 -29.71 -68.23 -68.23
(49.67) (42.65) (49.71) (49.71)
District = 7 -167.0 -117.8 -157.1 -157.1
(101.9) (84.69) (102.1) (102.1)
District = 8 13.96 -14.97 -6.294 -6.294
(138.7) (126.4) (139.0) (139.0)
Slightly sloped -107.1** -118.6** -118.6**
(43.41) (47.71) (47.71)
Good soil quality 4.682 5.021 5.021
(37.93) (43.80) (43.80)
Average soil quality 11.60 10.19 10.19
(38.15) (44.25) (44.25)
Constant 54.97 254.2** 151.7 151.7
(149.8) (129.4) (157.4) (157.4)
Durbin (Score) Chi2(1) 28.2373 24.7922 29.8135
Wu-Hausman F(1, N-K) (Score) Chi2(1) 28.372 24.8248 29.9172
Minimum Eigenvalue Statistic 341.668 385.935 341.942 341.942
Observations 1,126 1,390 1,126 1,126
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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6. Conclusion
Previous studies find conflicting results on the effect of titling on fixed
investment. This study adopts econometric tools to control for the endo-
geneity of land titles and unobserved heterogeneity to find the impacts
of land titling on investment. Using the 2010/2011 Tanzania National
Survey data, the results indicate a robust and positive relationship bet-
ween titling and long term investment as measured by the number of
trees and permanent crops planted on a plot. Due to the richness of the
data set, it was possible to control for a host of plot level and household
level characteristics, hence providing robust outcomes. Households tend
to increase the level of fixed investment on titled plots. This confirms the
general hypothesis that titling encourages long term investment.
This study is an improvement from previous literature in two ways. First,
it takes advantage of the continuous measure of fixed investment: num-
ber of permanent crops and trees planted on a plot. Almost all Previous
studies (Besley, 1995; Smith, 2004; Bellemare, 2010; Galiani and Schar-
grodsky, 2010) used discrete measures of whether there was investment
in trees, infrastructure or land improvements on a plot, hence limiting
the range of relationship between investment and titling status. Second
and most importantly, it introduces a more reliable instrument for titling
that yields consistent estimates with the fixed effects model. The results
also suggest that the empirical challenge in identifying the effects of pro-
perty rights on investment is attributed largely to endogeneity of titles.
However, the source of endogeneity is not clear from the study.
The results provide evidence on the positive impacts of formal land tit-
ling schemes to encourage investment. It should, however, be emphasized
that further policy actions should rely on the precise channels through
which formal titles enhance investment. Further tests of each of the pre-
sumed channels including improved access to credit, increased security,
ease of exchange or other possible links is critical in better understanding
the benefits and costs of titling programs. The study suggests that gover-
nment actions in similar African countries that improve tenure security
through titles can significantly enhance investment and further economic
activity. But, a closer look at the process of titling and possibilities of
rent seeking and elite capture should also be countered.
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